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My interest in the subject of motion pictures extends 
far past the development and the significance of the Motion 
Picture Patents Company. It does so because the history 
and changes in the film industry appear to both directly and 
indirectly reflect the history of the cultural, social, and 
economic trends of the period. 
I believe that this conclusion will be arrived at by 
any person who is interested in the art of motion pictures. 
The greatest percentage of the development of the motion 
picture industry, whether it be in the structure, innova-
tions, or the movies produced indicate something about the 
influences of the society in which it exists. 
Due to this fact, the study of the state of the indus-
try as well as it's art will hopefully shed light in the 
environment in which it existed. More to the point, to 
research and understand the Motion Picture Patents Company 
is to realize more about the nature of the first two de-
cades of the twentieth century and possibly the years to 
follow. 
It is my hope that an overview of the Motion Picture 
Patents Company will result in a confirmation that movies 
have and continue to reflect trends and period in history. 
A knowledge of this origin, developments, and destruction 
should contribute to this understanding. 
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Today, ninety short years after its conception, the 
film industry touches the lives of millions of people. Few 
people do not know of the money, the power, and the glamour 
that is held by the film world. It was this same knowledge 
that inticed hundreds of experimenters into the newly dis-
covered miracle called film at the turn of the century. 
Within a fifteen year period, from 1894 to 1980, movies had 
graduated from their novelty stage when they were typically 
fifty feet in length and photographed anything that moved 
to stories with relatively well-developed plots and charac-
ters that had dimensions. 
As the length increased so did the demand. As the de-
mand grew so did the amount of money involved and so did 
the number of people rushing to the gold mine. During the 
first decade of the twentieth century tens of thousands of 
Nickelodeons were in existence and millions of Americans 
were going to the movies weekly. Before long the infant 
industry was getting completely out of hand. The patrons 
were demanding more and more new films while the production 
companies worked at an almost frenzy. At the same time the 
problems concerning budgeting, production, and distribution 
were constantly growing. By 1908 the time was ripe for some-
one to step in and take control. On September 9th of that 
year the chaos was brought under control by the Motion Pic-
ture Patents Company. 
For that reason the MPPC, as it was called, is one of 
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the most intriguing areas in the history of film. What is 
amazing is the ease which a small number of men took al-
most total control of an industry. These men seized power 
in a business that was just beginning to see its capabil-
ities and therefore very vulnerable to opportunities. 
It was observed by these men that with their patents 
and a small amount of capital they could turn their invest-
ments into, as the founding members of the MPPC did, vast 
amounts of power and large profits. Practically overnight 
two companies, that is the holders of two major patents, 
turned the movie making business upside down and molded it 




The Beginning of a Monopoly, 1894-1908 
In fourteen short years motion pictures, which began 
as little more than an experiment, became firmly implanted 
in the American way of life and turned into an extremely 
lucrative business as well. It all started on Broadway in 
1894 with a machine called the Kinetoscope, which was a 
peephole machine that showed short filmstrips. The machine 
was originated, not by Thomas Edison as many were led to 
believe, but rather by Edison's assistant, William Kennedy 
Laurie Dickson, who had acquired a concession from Edison 
to market the invention (Balio, 1976, p. 3). 
With the boom well under way the limitation of the 
Kinetoscope, that only one viewer could see the filmstrip 
at a time, soon started to take its toll. Two years after 
its development the Kinetoscope became obsolete and was re-
placed by the motion picture projector that had the ability 
to show films to a room of customers. Almost simultaneously, 
Paul in England, the Lumiere brothers in France, the Lathams, 
Thomas Armat, Herman Casler, Albert E. Smith, and Dickson 
in the United States appeared with their own version of the 
new projector. Of these the only one protected by manufac-
turing and marketing rights, which were purchased by Edison, 
was Armat's projector called the Vitascope (Balio, 1976, p. 4). 
Shortly after the introduction of the Vitascope, came 
the invention of the Cinematographe, a Lumiere development 
and was quickly followed by the important discovery, the 
Biograph projector. This Dickson invention, exhibited as 
a product of American Mutoscope Company, achieved much 
larger and clearer pictures than ever before. 
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To go the American Mutoscope one better, Edison in 1896 
came out with his own projector called the Edison Projecting 
Kintoscope and placed it on the open market. As a result 
not only did Edison come up with a new piece of machinery 
but to place it on the open market was an innovative com-
mercial move as well, since prior to this the sale of most 
projectors was limited to certain geographical areas. With 
one swift blow Edison managed to simultaneously increase his 
sales significantly and to bolster the popularity of the 
growing industry. 
In the years 1895 to 1896 the increased demand for pro-
jectors also called for an increased production of films. 
Even at this early stage of the industry three production 
companies, Edison, Biograph, and Vitagraph were in almost 
total control. Through producing films these key patent 
holders hoped not only to be the leaders in creating films 
but in turn to create more of a demand for their equipment. 
It was at this time that Edison, afraid of any compe-
tition in the least, tightened his hold on what he thought 
was his industry. As Balio states, 
••• in December of 1897 Edison brought in-
fringement suits against nearly every organization 
and individual of consequence that had entered the 
business. In pressing the cases, his lawyers in-
sisted that all inventors and manufacturers, of 
motion picture equipment, and all producers in 
the United States, were in violation of the pa-
tent rights that Edison had secured on his Kineto-
scope. The main targets of Edison's legal attack-
the American Mutoscope and Biograph Company 
(formally the American Mutoscope Company) and the 
Vitascope Company - stood and fought by entering 
counterclaims (Balio, 1976, pp. 7-8). 
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Still, the ever popular movie business went on, de-
spite the underlying court battles and the raging competi-
tion. With the increasing size of the industry came new 
problems that had not been anticipated. One such problem 
was in the distribution of films. In answer to the problems 
between 1903 and 1908 what was known as the exchange system 
came into being. Prior to this exhibitors had bought their 
films but because the investment had been so heavy that an 
exchange would buy the films and then rent them to the exhi-
bitors. As a result, exhibitors payed less for pictures and 
were also able to change their pictures more often to keep 
their customers returning more frequently. This in turn sti-
mulated their business, raised their profits, and expanded 
the interest potential customers everywhere. 
By 1907 selling prices had soared despite the fact that 
competition and rivialies were stiff. The combination of 
high prices and competition led to the creation of several 
somewhat dishonest alternatives. It was at this time that 
the exchanges developed a practice known as "duping" in 
order to cheat the manufacturers of the films. Duping con-
sisted of the exchanges buying a film, making a negative of 
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it, making a print of the negative, and then selling the 
print as an original. The exchanges also found ways of 
cheating the exhibitors on the end as well. To save money 
exchanges would often send prints that had been damaged 
beyond repair or prints that were cheaper than had been 
ordered. 
In order to fight back the exhibitors had their own 
dirty tricks. The most famous of these was called "bi-
cycling." This happened when, 
A group of theatres under one ownership, or 
associated for mutual profit, would rent a 
picture for one theatre but so arrange the 
schedule of screenings in the other theatres 
that a boy on a bicycle could race with the 
same print under his arm from one theatre to 
another (Jacobs, 1968, p. 54). 
In spite of the dishonest practices going on the num-
ber of exchanges steadily increased as did the popularity 
of motion pictures. In response to the great demand for 
films Harry Davis and John P. Harris developed the "Nickel-
odeon" in 1905. Named because of the five cent admission 
price the, 
••• catchy name of the place, the colorful 
surroundings, the musical renditions, and the 
story picture combined to keep the ninety-
six seats of the Nickelodeon creaking with 
the excitement of customers from eight in the 
morning until twelve at night. Nickels poured 
into the cash box so rapidly that soon the 
receipts were averaging over a thousand dol-
lars weekly (Jacobs, 1968, p. 55). 
Yet, underlying the steady growth of the industry were very 
strong dissentions. Competition produced endless lawsuits, 
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cutthroat practices, such as duping and bicycling, constant 
arguments, and numerous legal violations. Though there 
were hundreds of lawsuits going on in the early 1900's a 
great number of these were intigated by Edison. Further-
more, it was noted that, 
In this warlike atmosphere of patent li-
tigation, every studio became a guarded strong-
hold. Producers, who spent much of their time 
acting as litigants, fortified their studios to 
conceal their production methods, in fear either 
of having their own legitimate inventions stolen, 
or of being caught in a patent infringement 
against someone else (Balio, 1976, p. 16). 
Of those to survive the mass of legal battles were 
those that held patents. These included Edison, Biograph, 
Vitagraph, Selig, Kalem, Essanay, Lubin, and from Europe 
George Klein (Balio, 1976, p. 16). It would be these same 
survivors, the all important patent holders that would go 
on to create the motion picture industry's first monopoly, 
the Motion Picture Patents Company. In the ten years fol-
lowing 1908 these men would make millions of dollars and 
have almost total control over every aspect of the motion 
picture industry. 
Events Leading to the Development of the MPPC 
The growth of the motion picture business 
was stymied almost from the start by incessant 
strife over patent claims. The patent war, as 
it was called, was declared by Edison in 1897, 
when he brought suit against Charles H. ·webster, 
and continued until 1908, and involved hun-
dreds of legal disputes. Edison patented his 
camera on August 24, 1891, but it was not until 
1896 that he filed for a patent on his film. 
When he received his letters patent the follow-
ing year, he took action to capture the market. 
Edison's lawyers claimed that all manufactur-
ers of motion picture equipment and all film 
producers were operating in violation of the 
patents he secured on his Kinetoscope (Balio, 
1976, p. 120). 
Edison's main assaults were aimed at his strongest 
competitor, the American Mutoscope and Biograph Company. 
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In the ensuing court battles, the courts sustained Edison's 
camera patent, but not his film's. At the same time, Bio-
graph's camera, which was carefully designed to be non-
infringing, was allowed. Since the courts declared neither 
side the winner, producers began to align themselves to one 
side or the other as a form of protection. 
In the six years between 1908 and 1914, the industry 
began to expand as never before. This involved new tech-
niques, more competition, and bigger money in a business 
where everyone wanted a share. The movie industry was mov-
ing into the big times. As the demand for the number of 
films grew, so did the fierce competition. It was reported 
that, "The number of manufacturers, importers and exchange 
men in the industry mounted to between fifty and one hundred, 
and nickelodeons into the thousands." Though manufacturing 
was left open to anyone, at this point only Edison, Biograph, 
and Vitagraph have legal patents and legal rights to do so. 
Despite this fact, lawsuits were increasing, cutthroat prac-
tices grew daily, and enemies were spreading (Jacobs, 1968, 
p. 81). 
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The Motion Picture Patents Company 
On October 1, 1915 a federal court handed down its 
decision that the Motion Picture Patents Company and its 
offspring, the General Film Company (GFC), were in viola-
tion of the Sherman and Clayton acts in relation to the 
monopolizing of the motion picture industry. It charged 
that the MPPC and the GFC had worked to gain " ••• the con-
trol of all motion picture production through interlocking 
agreements, the elimination of competition on the distri-
bution level, and price fixing of raw film and motion pic-
tures" (Balio, 1976, p. 119). This decision came less than 
eight years after the company's conception. 
The formation of the MPPC occurred on January 1, 1909 
as a discreet effort to call a truce between the Edison 
Manufacturing Company and American Mutoscope and Biograph 
Company. Between these two companies all the important pa-
tents on film, cameras, and projectors were held, and by 
joining together they hoped to extinguish any hopes that 
competitive companies had to move in on their monopoly. 
The company was composed of seven domestic manufacturers, 
Edison, Biograph, Vitagraph, Essanay, Selig, Lubin, and 
Kalern: two French companies, Melies and Pathe; and the dis-
tributor George Kleine (Jacobs, 1968, p. 42). In order to 
control the motion picture business, the MPPC sought to be-
come involved in all ends of the industry including: 1) 
production of raw film; 2) the production of motion pictures; 
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3) the manufacturing of projecting equipment; 4) film dis-
tribution; and 5) exhibition. A further explanation of 
these five segments are as follows: 
1) In exchange for mutually supportive mono-
poly privileges, the MPPC agreed to deal ex-
clusively with the Eastman Kodak Company, the 
principal domestic producer of raw film stock. 
Consequently, the Patents Company received a 
buying monopoly and Eastman a selling monopoly. 
Eastman was not charged a royalty, but acted 
on behalf of the company to collect film roy-
alties from licensed producers. 
2) Motion picture manufacture was regulated by 
the granting of licenses to Edison and their 
former allies ••• The companies were permitted 
to use only Eastman film stock and could pro-
duce any number of pictures, but the importers 
were restricted as to the footage they could 
release. The MPPC, not the producers, set the 
prices that exchanges would be charged for films. 
The scale ranged from nine to thirteen cents per 
foot for new releases. In this way, licensees 
operated in a protected market. No new manufa-
cturer could be granted a license, moreover, 
unless a majority of MPPC members agreed (Balio, 
1 9·7 6 , p • 12 2 ) • 
Throug~ the interlocking agreements, the MPPC took con-
trol of almost every area of the industry while simultan-
eously protecting itself from competition and allowing its 
members to operate with pretty much the freedom they desired. 
Though the licensees had to work within their designated 
area, that is, distributors could not exhibit and so forth, 
distributors could operate in any market area and charge 
exhibitors any price they could get for their film service. 
Likewise, producers had the freedom to decide the length 
and number of pictures they produced and exhibitors could 
purchase whatever programs of film they desired from li-
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censed exchanges and set their own admission prices (Balio, 
1976, p. 123). 
3) By holding the crucial patents on projectors, 
the MPPC held direct control over equipment manu-
facture and sales. Each projector sold for a 
fixed price - $150 in 1909 - $5 of which went to 
the MPPC as a royalty. 
4) By controlling all aspects of motion picture and 
equipment manufacture, the MPPC could lay down its 
conditions to distributors. A licensed distributor 
had to deal with MPPC members exclusively. Films 
were leased to him at flat rates; however, in 
dealing with exhibitors, he could charge whatever 
price the market would bear. Exchanges were re-
quired to purchase $2,500 worth of film per month. 
They were not charged royalties but acted as agents 
for the MPPC by collecting from exhibitors the two-
dollar a week royalty on projectors. The Patents 
Company granted licenses to 116 exchanges, the 30 
or 40 others were driven out of business. Those 
that remained under the MPPC's aegis led precarious 
existences. The MPPC held arbitrary power to can-
cel the distributor's license without cause upon 
fourteen days' notice. 
5) Since box-office revenues were the major source 
of industry revenue, the MPPC royalty scheme was 
aimed primarily at the theatre. In turn for the 
right to use licensed projectors (on which the two-
dollar royalty was levied each week) the exhibitor 
had to agree to show only licensed motion pictures. 
If he violated the contract by exhibiting outlaw 
pictures, by refusing to pay royalties, or by sub-
leasing prints to other theatres, he could be 
fined, or sued, or have his license revoked (Balio, 
1976, p. 122-123). 
In addition to their two-dollar rental fee on films 
and projectors, 
~ •• theatres were classified and the rental 
rates of pictures were standardized accord-
ingly, each exhibitor paying according to his 
class. Rates for the highest class were $100 
to $125 weekly for a daily change of program; 
the cheapest rate was $15. When a system of 
booking films was formed, it was provided that 
the exhibitor could not change the date or 
selection of pictures once they had been ar-
ranged for. Violators were to be either fined 
or wholly deprived of the film service (Jacobs, 
1968 , p. 8 2) • 
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Accompanying the exhibitor royalty, the MPPC also 
charged machine royalties, which was a five dollar charge 
in return for granting certain companies the right to manu-
facture projectors. Furthermore, there was a third type 
of royalty which charged licensed producers of movies a 
half a cent per foot of film produced. At the end of the 
year the royalties were distributed with 
••• Edison receiving an amount equal to 'net 
film royalties' and Biograph two-thirds of 
the remainder. The balance was distributed 
in these proportions: Edison, one-half; 
Biograph, one-third; Armat, one-sixth; Vita-
graph, the fourth company in the pool, was 
paid from the top, one dollar for each pro-
jecting machine sold (Balio, 1976, p. 122). 
The royalties were collected by the MPPC from various 
areas. For example, the film royalties were collected by 
Eastman Kodak from the licensed manufacturers while the two-
dollar exhibitor fees, charged the thousands of theatres 
scattered over the country, were collected by rental ex-
changes. These royalties amounted to a substantial sum, 
obviously. In the years 1910 and 1911 the fees collected 
totaled $800,000 while in the years of 1912 and 1913 they 
amounted to nearly $1,000,000 (Balio, 1976, p. 124). 
Similar data substantiates the evidence that the MPPC 
had the corner on a booming industry. Records show that 
1) The total business of the whole industry 
last year (1913) was more than $300,000,000 
••• 2) There were 5,000,000,000 paid admis-
sions in 1913 to our more than 20,000 moving 
picture theatres which show 96,000,000 feet 
of film each night ••• 3) American film makers 
will export this year probably 25,000 miles 
of pictures; and the royalty paid to Mr. 
Edison is said to amount to about $10,000 a 
week (Lanier, June 1914, p. 217). 
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Joseph P. Kennedy, who has written a book on the early 
history of films, corroborates these statements in his book, 
The Story of the Films. As he explains, 
In those days they (MPPC) had a perfect con-
trol of business ••• They regulated the wages 
paid in every branch of the industry. In 
their judgement, no man who wrote a story and 
gave his brains to create material for motion 
pictures was entitled to more than $25 for the 
finest story he could write. For those men 
who were known as directors of motion pictures, 
they established a salary of $50 a week. The 
highest salary they agreed to pay a performer 
was $60 a week. They made up their minds that 
this was not an industry or art, but that it 
was a mechanical occupation and that it requir-
ed no brains (Kennedy, 1927, p. 303). 
The MPPC discovered soon after its conception that the 
imposed fees were met with much resistance. In order to 
enforce the regulations, 
••• the Trust filed lawsuits by the hundreds, 
employed private detectives to search for 
evidence of patent violations, and called 
upon federal marshalls to arrest offenders, 
confiscate their equipment, and throw them 
in jail (Balio, 1976, p. 104). 
General Film Company 
In April of 1910, the MPPC, in hopes of strengthening 
its hold on the industry, formed the General Film Company, 
which was a national film exchange. The action resulted 
in a vertical integration of the business. 
General Film was capitalized at $2 million, 
later reduced to $1 million. The ten members 
of the Patents Company purchased equal amounts 
of the stock, which was to yield a continuous 
12 percent annual dividend. With this finan-
cial base, General Film set out to acquire ex-
changes. There were sixty-nine licensed ex-
changes at that time. If a licensed exchange 
did not want to sell, its license was revoked 
or suspended, so that it could not legitimately 
do business with the company. Beginning with 
the purchase of two from MPPC member George 
Kleine, General Film acquired eleven in one 
month, twenty-three within three months, and by 
January 1, 1912, a total of fifty-eight exchanges. 
After ten others were canceled, there remained only 
William Fox's Greater New York Film Rental Company. 
Except for the New York market, there was but a 
single source of licensed film available to all 
the exhibitors in the United States (Balio, 1976, 
pp. 125-126). 
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Under the GFC the rules and regulations were almost id-
entical to those under the MPPC, except that the GFC was the 
one who had to pay film royalties on a footage basis in re-
turn for its exclusive contract. The GFC also added to its 
practices the regulation of prices, that is, first of all 
it fixed the price for positive prints at ten cents per 
foot. The price was based on average costs and wage scales; 
it was fixed and producers had to stay within it. Second, 
General Film classified theatres according to location and 
drawing power which resulted in the largest class being 
charged from $100 or $125, to $15 for the smallest ones 
(Balio, 1976, p. 126). 
The Rise of the Independents 
Many authors, upon studying the formation of the MPPC, 
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conclude that it may well have been doomed from its origin 
(Jacobs, 1968, p. 83). If this is not the case, from an 
objective point of view, it is generally agreed that it was 
becoming ineffective by 1913, and possibly as early as 1912 
(Jacobs, 1968, p. 84). The reason for this ineffectiveness 
was that as MPPC strengthened its control on the exhibitors 
and increased the policing of them and the lawsuits against 
them, resulting in multiplied rebellions. 
Bitter opposition from all quarters greeted 
the Trust combined. Manufacturers and ex-
change men who were outside the pool refused 
to be victimized without a struggle. Boot-
legging of films and projectors began; an 
underground between independents and exhibi-
tors was soon flourishing. Although over 
$10,000 small exhibitors signed with the Pa-
tents Company, all regarded the $2 tax as a 
dictatorial raid on their profits. To fight 
the Trust, many protective organizations 
(similar to the 'Patents Company without the 
patents') were formed: the National Indepen-
dent Motion Picture Alliance, Chicago, Ill-
inois; the Associated Independent Film Manu-
facturers, New York City; and most important 
of all, the Motion Picture Distributing and 
Sales Company, with Carl Laemmle as president 
(Jacobs, 1968, p. 83). 
In reply to the growing number of independents, the 
MPPC sought to fight back and the result was, in 1912, the 
formation of the General Film Company. For a time this 
appeared to be the answer. But, soon after its creation, 
the independents again fought back. Instead of killing the 
competition, it only angered them more. As Jacobs states, 
"Outlaw companies multiplied, flourished, and continued 
making pictures." By 1912, Jacobs indicates that such pro-
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ducing companies as Fox, Keystone, the New York Motion 
Picture Company, along with dozens of others were opposing 
the MPPC and the GFC, (Jacobs, 1968, p. 83) as were such 
distributors as Mutual and Universal. "By 1914, literally 
hundreds of new firms had entered the business" (Balio, 
1976, p. 105). 
Growing increasingly bolder, and encouraged by their 
size, the independents began to go public with their fight 
against the MPPC and "They encouraged defiance of the 
Trust, offering not only cheaper prices, but also better 
products. As Bardeche and Brasillach state, 
They (the independents) bought foreign cameras 
which had the advantage of being independent 
of Edison's patent but also the disadvantage 
of working very badly. So they took the works 
out of them and replaced them with Edison's 
machinery. At the same time they took action 
by hiring away technicians from the Trust and 
offering them twice as much pay; for if you 
employ one camera man you can afford to pay 
him well, whereas the Trust had fifty and did 
not want to raise their wages. By these meth-
ods, the outlaws produced some excellent films 
which the cinemas accepted more readily since 
to do so was to injure the Trust further 
(Bardeche and Brasillach, 1970, p. 60). 
But the MPPC would not give up its hold on the business and 
showed that they would stop at nothing, " ••• for almost five 
years guerilla warfare, with open violence as well as law-
suits, raged between the monopoly and the independents, no 
strategy being overlooked by either side." It even went 
so far as sabotaging equipment, harassment, and hiring de-
tectives. Bardeche and Brasillach add that the private 
detectives began to smash the cameras of many of the in-
dependents. 
On the pretext of taking affidavits, they 
gained admittance to the studios and then 
seized and smashed the cameras. Each sally 
of this kind led to a pitched battle. The 
small producers migrated to the suburbs of 
New York or Chicago: the private detectives 
followed them. Armed guards were organized 
at the studios, but the detectives, became 
burglers, still managed to break in 
(Bardeche and Brasillach, 1970, p. 61). 
18 
By this time though, it actually made very little dif-
ference what struggle the MPPC made to survive because its 
destruction was almost complete. The one distributor, who 
failed to sell to the GFC, had taken his complaints against 
the monopoly to the courts and filed a lawsuit claiming 
that " ••• the defendants control from 70 to 80 percent of a 
trade in which a sum in excess of $100,000,000 is declared 
to be invested ••• " It continues that, "It is alleged that 
the defendants overstept the bounds of lawful monopoly by 
interlocking their various patents and then refusing to grant 
a license obligating him to use extensively the films of 
the combination" (Literary Digest, August 31, l9l2, p. 322). 
The suit was brought to the courts in January of 1913 and 
resulted in the dissolution of the Motion Picture Patents 
Company in 1917, four years later. 
The Significance of the MPPC 
Despite all of the restrictions, struggles, and con-
flicts that marked the short history of the MPPC, remark-
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edly enough, an amazing amount of good came out of it. 
Actually it would be unfair to say that the manifestations 
were the results of the MPPC when more credit is due to 
the clashes between the independents and the MPPC. That is 
to say, it was because of the independents' revolt against 
the monopolistic designs of the MPPC, that at least three 
lasting artistic and economic innovations came about. 
The first innovation, the star system, was the result 
of the independents attack on the monopoly's refusal to 
raise the salaries of the actors under contract by ensuring 
that they retained their anonymity. As Jocobs states, 
"Movie patrons by 1910 were favoring certain players and 
expressing their preferences, although as yet the names of 
their screen idols were unknown" (Jacobs, 1968, p. 86). 
The reason behind this was that the MPPC felt that once the 
names of the actors were known the public would demand that 
their favorite actors appear more frequently which would re-
sult in the actors requesting more money. The MPPC refused 
to give in to the public's appeal by continuing their 
practice of keeping this information secret. 
Seeing what was going on, the independents realized 
that this was a flaw in the foundations of the MPPC. The 
independents began to reason that if the public wanted to 
know the actor's names and about their lives why not tell 
them, for this would be a way of simultaneously getting the 
public to stop going to the films produced by the Trust and 
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start going to those produced by the independents. On 
March 12, 1910 the first publicity stunt to achieve just 
these ends was conducted. Carl Loemmle, the head of Inde-
pendent Motion Picture Company (IMP) and a leading indepen-
dent, created what has become known as the first star, an 
actress named Florence Lawrence, employed previously by 
Biograph. The story goes that, "St. Louis citizens awoke 
one morning to read in the newspapers that the former Bio-
graph player Florence Lawrence (this was the first time her 
name was publically used) had died in a St. Louis streetcar 
accident." Soon after Loerrunle took out an article with the 
title "WE NAIL A LIE" which stated, 
The blackest and at the same time the silliest 
lie yet circulated by enemies of the 'IMP' was 
the story foisted on the public of St. Louis 
last week to the effect that Miss Lawrence 
(the 'IMP' girl, formerly known as the 'Bio-
graph' girl) had been killed by a streetcar. 
It was a black lie because it was so cowardly. 
It was a silly lie because it was so easily 
disproved. Miss Lawrence was not even in a 
streetcar accident, is in the best of health, 
will continue to appear in 'IMP' films, and 
very shortly some of the best works in her 
career is to be released. We now announce our 
next films: 'The Broken Path' ••• 'The Time 
Lock Safe' ••• 
As if this wasn't enough, Florence Lawrence and IMP's 
leading man were to make a personal appearance in St. Louis. 
When they appeared, they were greeted by hundreds of fans 
eager to catch a glimpse of the two movie stars. Stardom 
was created (Jacobs, 1968, pp. 86-87). 
The temptations of publicity and increased salaries 
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were soon hitting most of the actors. The big talents were 
leaving the MPPC in groves to join the ranks of the inde-
pendents. Nothing could stop them, not even the threat of 
black listing by the Trust. Soon the publicity went fur-
ther than just names on billboards. It had not increased 
to autographs, photos, fan mail, and even fan magazines. 
The publication of the first fan magazine was by none other 
than a Trust member, Vitagraph in 1912. By this time the 
Trust members realized they could not avoid the demand or 
success of the star system any longer and the fan magazine 
was proof that once in the system they did not want to be 
outdone. Now it was only a fight as to which companies 
could go one better than the others. 
Through all of this the actors became the pivotal point, 
the center of attraction of the movie industry. Now, rather 
than just playing a role, roles were made for them. Sala-
ries became exorbitant as studios realized the box-office 
potentials of certain stars. For example, Mary Pickford was 
paid $5 a day at Biograph in 1909, to a luring $175 a week 
at IMP in 1910, to $20,000 a year, to $1,000 a week in 1914 
with Adolph Zukor (Balio, 1976, pp. 136-137). Actors were 
no longer considered commodities that could be ignored. In-
stead, they were box-office attractions and money in the 
bank, a factor that is still very much alive today. 
The second innovation was that the movies being pro-
duced were longer and of a higher quality than ever before. 
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This change has been credited to the work of the indepen-
dents who were not only hiring away actors but also many of 
the MPPC's directors and cameramen. In addition to hiring 
away Trust members and giving them more freedom, the inde-
pendents were also viewing, importing, and imitating foreign 
films. In these foreign films the independents saw that 
they were greater in length, depth, and techniques, espe-
cially in the case of the French and the Italians. As stat-
ed by Bardeche and Brasillach, 
••• in 1908 and 1909 a considerable number 
of more ambitious films were made in America. 
A Faust appeared, then a Carmen. The Ital-
ian successes had given Hobart Bosworth the 
idea of introducing Roman togas and peplums 
to the Califorian scenery. The French films, 
too, found their imitators. The same Hobart 
Bosworth produced dramas inspired by Henry 
Bataille against backgrounds worthy of the 
Theatre-Francais itself, with officers and 
gentlemen of fashion strolling through them, 
gesticulating and looking extremely grand. 
Ladies with elaborate lace waists and stuffed 
birds on their hats fainted on Louis XV sofas. 
Disgraced businessmen blew out their brains 
at Empire desks, The Roman, The Code of Honor, 
The Evil Men Do appeared as two-reel films, 
advertised as 'first class' in order to em-
barrass the Trust, whose films thus auto-
matically became second class (Bardeche and 
Brasillach, 1970, p. 63). 
Adolf Zukor also saw that the American public was ready 
for longer films, and even went so far as to speak to the 
MPPC officials about it to no avail. Zukor then decided to 
go out on his own by importing the French film Queen 
Elizabeth with Sarah Bernhardt and then going on to form 
his own group of actors called the Famous Players in 1912 
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(Balio, 1976, p. 107). With the Famous Players he began 
to produce, write, and distribute his own feature length 
films. 
This was only the beginning of the independents expan-
sion and experimentation while the MPPC refused to change. 
This was because they (the MPPC) felt that the American, 
" ••• audiences did not have the mental capacity to understand, 
let alone appreciate, longer films" (Balio, 1976, p. 107). 
Instead, the Trust ruled that the films could not -be releas-
ed that were any longer than one or at the most two reels. 
Even films that were made by Vitagraph in four or five reels 
were sent out at the rate of one reel a week (Macgowen, 
1965, p. 156). 
For this reason not only did the independents begin to 
compete with the Trust but they also began to surpass them 
with many of their films. With this, 
••• it became apparent to the conservative men-
bers of the Trust that the impact of the in-
dependents' competition was due in no small 
measure to their superior products. The Trust 
members there upon began to budget their pic-
tures higher, increase their personnel, raise 
their own standards, allow their directors 
greater leeway. Higher artistic standards, 
technical improvements, and a more ambitious 
state of mind finally led to the acceptance of 
the most significant advancement of all, the 
'feature' (Jacobs, 1968, p. 25) • 
The third innovation was that of the independents es-
tablishing Hollywood as the new nucleus for the creation and 
production of films. There were several reasons why Holly-
wood became the capital for motion picture production. 
First, it was a refuge from the attacks of the MPPC. As 
Jacobs states, 
Independents filed from New York, the center 
of production activity, to Cuba, Florida, 
San Francisco, and Los Angeles. Cuba proved 
to be disease-ridden; Florida, too warm, San 
Francisco, too far from the Mexican border. 
The safest refuge was Los Angeles, from which 
it was only a hop-skip-and-jump to the Mexican 
border and escape from injunctions and supoenas. 
Other advantages soon showed this location to 
be more desirable than New York; good all-year-
round weather, cheap labor, a rich variety of 
topography, and the ready co-operation of busi-
ness and real-estate interests in the community 
(Jacobs, 1968, p. 85). 
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Expanding on the independents move to Hollywood Macgowen 
remarks, 
There was no need for electricity in sunny 
California. All summer and except for a few 
rainy days, all winter, interiors could be 
shot out of doors with only muslin overhead 
to kill the sharp shadows. California and 
the neighboring states offered another at-
traction as potent as their sunshine. Los 
Angeles was close to a great many different 
kinds of landscape that could not be enjoyed 
in the East. From San Diego to San Fran-
cisco and eastward to Arizona there was al-
most every variety of mountain, valley, lake, 
seacoast, island, desert, countryside, and 
plain that a story might call for. Much of 
the seacoast was barren of habitation. Where 
there were houses, a type of local architec-
ture sometimes provided Mediterranean atmos-
phere. Westerns, popular even before the days 
of the finest feature films, could be shot 
in Griffith Park or San Fernando Valley with-
out leaving Los Angeles County (Macgowen, 
1965, p. 139). 
Soon, even some of the members of the Trust were no-
ticing the attractiveness of California. Actors, directors, 
producers were flocking to the sunshine including such well 
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knowns as Samuel Goldwyn, Cecil B. DeMille, Jesse L. Lasky, 
D. W. Griffith, Billy Bitzer, Thomas H. Ince, Max Sennett, 
and Charlie Chaplin to name a few (Knight, 1978, pp. 19-38). 
Furthermore, not only were the movie people interested 
in the sunshine, but there were other assets in moving to 
California. As Jacobs adds, 
The colonization of Hollywood at that par-
ticular time was fortunate in many respects. 
The availability of all production needs 
and advantages made it possible to produce 
better pictures more regularly and more 
efficiently. Movie makers now had space 
to work in; the pressure of financial super-
vision was lighter; getting dependable act-
ing talent was easier. With the financial 
offices separated from the production studios, 
film directors were more independent, could 
use their ingenuity and ideas more freely. 
The centralization of all production agencies 
created an esprit de corps and a competitive 
spirit that stimulated ambition, personal rivalry, 
and creativeness. The effort of each company 
to impress its neighbor and its Eastern offices 
often resulted in a refinement of its product. 
Before long, in fact, the designation of a 
picture as 'a Hollywood product' was a commercial 
asset. Since it meant that the picture had 
met a high professional standard (Jacobs, 1968, 
pp. 85-86). 
With this the movie industry was on its way to becoming what 




From 1908 to 1919, a period of ten years the Motion 
Pictures Patents Company had experienced more power in the 
film industry than any one company had before and probably 
ever would again. It controlled almost every end of the 
business from the patents on equipment, to production, to 
distribution. As the monopoly it soon turned into, it con-
trolled the actors, the directors, the cameramen, the tech-
nicians, and even the theatre owners. But because of the 
immense power, members of the Trust let it get completely 
out of control. They set too many rules and pressured too 
hard. 
Their second mistake was their refusal to change. Be-
cause of their magnitude and the grip they held over the 
movie industry they were afraid to change. Faced with new 
and different demands from the times, the public, and those 
creating films, the MPPC chose to ignore thses signs and 
demands. Rather, they enforced the old rules until a re-
volt started from within that became so large nothing could 
be done to stop it. The independents soon took charge and 
gave the public what they wanted. This began the forma-
tion of many of the studios that survived for decades to 
come, and some which are still alive today, including Para-
mount, United Artists, Warner Brothers, and Universal. The 
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time was gone that one company could or would be allowed to 
control the vast areas of the industry. 
The MPPC has been condemned for several reasons. The 
first of these has been the formation of a monopoly that in 
the true sense of the word had exclusive control, in this 
case of the movie industry, allowing no competition whatso-
ever. What makes it so interesting is the ease which this 
was done. It was in a time when everyone wanted a piece of 
the action, with lawsuits piling up against all of the sup-
posed 'true patent' holders of cameras and projectors. In-
cluded in the numbers of men who simultaneously discovered 
the magic of motion pictures were Edison and his assistant 
Dickson, with the Kinetoscope, Muybridge with the zoopraxin-
scope, Paul in England, and Lumiere in France. C.Ombine all 
of these simultaneous inventions with the increasing demands 
and interest in movies by the American public and a young 
and naive business ripe for someone to step forward and 
take charge; the result was the MPPC. 
Secondly, it cannot be stressed enough how much money 
the members of the Patents C.Ompany grossed, or how much 
power they possessed, or worst of all how this power got 
completely out of control. The latter facet of the MPPC 
is what is so terribly disturbing. It seems hard to be-
lieve that the members thought the motion picture business 
was so fragile that it could not stand change or possible 
improvement. Or still, that they and they alone should be 
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in charge, and that they had to go so far as to destroy 
equipment and terrorize non-members to prove it. 
Yet not all aspects of the MPPC were bad. For in-
stance, in its early days it could have been credited with 
stopping the so called 'patents war' by consolidating the 
patent holders into one company and bringing order and or-
ganization to what otherwise may have been a chaotic mass 
of independent producers and distributors. With the Pa-
tents Company there was a clear structure, strict as it may 
have been, for the members to follow. Starting with the 
patents on the equipment, to the production of raw film, to 
the production and distribution of the film the structure 
was clear. 
The second and probably most important aspect of the 
MPPC from an observer's viewpoint approximately seventy 
years later, is the amount of talent that the MPPC discover-
ed. There are names and talents that have proved to be in-
valuable to the history of the film industry. Such talents 
as Florence Lawrence, Gilbert M. Anderson (Bronco Billy), 
Mary Pickford, Charlie Chaplin; directors such as D. W. 
Griffith, Edwin s. Porter, Thomas H. Ince working with 
cameramen the likes of Billy Bitzer were all at one time 
employed by the MPPC. In addition, it was formed with such 
major companies as Essanay, Lubin, Pathe, Freres, Selig, 
and Vitagraph, as well as the producers Fox, IMP, and Key-
stone, and the distributors Mutual and Universal. With all 
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of these talents together at one time and the proper utili-
zation it may well have been one of the film industry's 
golden eras. Therefore, despite its flaws, it produced a 
vast amount of talent who themselves made movie history. 
As a result, the MPPC's place in the production of films 
cannot be forgotten or discredited. 
Outside of its merits and shortcomings the development 
and the destruction of the MPPC indicates two major influ-
ences of the environment of the turn of the century. The 
first conclusion is that the MPPC came into existance in 
part because of the attitude of the country and its ready 
acceptance of the movies as a form of entertainment. In a 
period of a few years millions of people were weekly viewing 
films and enjoying the excitement of the moving pictures. 
In fact, the first twenty years of the 1900's have been 
called the golden years, as data indicates. It was a time 
of pleasure and free money spending; when the United States 
was the richest country in the world. During the period 
people were experiencing the invention of the airplane, the 
automobile, long distance telephone calls, and the five-
cent movies. Before long movies became firmly engrained in 
the American way of life. 
Secondly, because of the ease of the development of the 
Trust and its offshoot the General Film Q)mpany I must con-
clude that monopolies were not an uncommon phenomonom for 
the early twentieth century. In fact, data shows that sev-
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eral hundred monopolies existed in the first ten years of 
the century. This was due to the rapid expansion of pro-
duction and the lax definitions of the antitrust laws which 
made them difficult to enforce. 
To fight the monopolies investigations involved such 
industries as beef, steel, oil, mining, telephone, as well 
as the motion pictures. In short, public sentiments were 
running high against the monopolies and its creators, es-
pecially when the public saw that the situation was getting 
completely out of hand and the "common man" was getting 
crushed. For this reason the Motion Picture Patents Company 
was created and destroyed by the times as much as any other 
factor. 
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